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Abstract 
Although users often express strong positive intentions to follow security policies, these positive 
intentions fail to consistently translate to behavior. In a security setting, the inconsistency between 
intentions and behavior—termed the intention-behavior gap—is particularly troublesome, as a single 
failure to enact positive security intentions may make a system vulnerable. We address a need in 
security compliance literature to better understand the intention-behavior gap by explaining how an 
omnipresent competing intention—the user’s desire to minimize required effort—negatively 
moderates the relationship between positive intentions and actual security behavior. Moreover, we 
posit that this moderating effect is not accounted for in extant theories used to explain behavioral 
information security, introducing an opportunity to broadly impact information security research to 
more consistently predict behavior. In three experiments, we found that high levels of required effort 
negatively moderated users’ intentions to follow security policies. Controlling for this moderating 
effect substantially increased the explained variance in security policy compliance. The results 
suggest that security researchers should be cognizant of the existence of competing intentions, such 
as the desire to minimize required effort, which may moderate the security intention-behavior 
relationship. Otherwise, such competing intentions may cause unexpected inconsistencies between 
users’ intentions to behave securely and their actual security behavior. 
Keywords: Security, Intention-Behavior Gap, Effort, Passwords, Information Disclosure, 
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1 Introduction 
Computer users who are not compliant with security 
policies pose a serious threat to their organizations 
(Chang & Seow, 2019). Security breaches caused by a 
lack of compliance with security policies can create 
significant upheavals, such as credit card number theft 
(Kolkowska, Karlsson, & Hedström, 2017; Willey & 
White, 2019) and government data theft (Abelson et 
al., 2015). Security breaches can have a negative 
impact on a firm’s financial performance, market 
value, reputation, and may even lead to government 
sanctions (Avery & Ranganathan, 2016). The damages 
from security breaches have been estimated to cost 
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars per 
incident (IBM, 2019). Despite the potential harm from 
security breaches, employees’ disregard of security 
policies is prevalent (Balozian & Leidner, 2017). 
To help encourage compliance, a rich body of 
literature has examined how to improve users’ 
intentions to comply with organizations’ security 
policies (Moody, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2018). In 
general, intentions, or the readiness to perform a given 
behavior, impact behavior in a meaningful way 
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(Sheeran, 2002); however, in a security setting, 
positive intentions are frequently inconsistent with 
actual behavior, which may result in serious security 
vulnerabilities (Crossler et al., 2014). We suggest that 
one reason for this inconsistency, termed the intention-
behavior gap (Sheeran, 2002), is that the user 
encounters different competing intentions when 
performing security behaviors—one of which is the 
user’s omnipresent desire to minimize the amount of 
required effort to complete a task. Required effort 
refers to the actual effort needed to behave securely at 
the moment a user encounters a security decision. We 
posit that the effect of required effort on behavior is not 
currently accounted for in constructs (e.g., perceived 
behavioral control) included in various prevalent 
theories used to predict security behavior—such as the 
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), protection 
motivation theory (Rogers, 1975), or deterrence theory 
(D’Arcy & Herath, 2011). We leverage Zipf’s law 
(Zipf, 1949) to explain how the desire to reduce 
required effort moderates the intention-behavior 
relationship in a security setting. In summary, we 
address the following research question:  
RQ: How does required effort moderate the intention-
behavior relationship in the context of users’ 
adherence to security policies? 
We performed three experiments in two contexts 
(password creation and information sharing) to answer 
our research question. By accounting for the 
moderating effect of required effort on the intention-
behavior relationship, the explained variance in actual 
behavior often doubled in our experiments, and the 
effect sizes of adding effort were large, medium, and 
medium for Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively.   
Our results indicate that IT security managers and 
researchers must strive to understand competing 
intentions in a security context—such as the user’s 
desire to minimize required effort—when 
implementing security controls. Otherwise, this 
required effort may decrease the influence of one’s 
positive intentions on behavior, mitigating the effect of 
various organizational efforts to improve intentions 
and thereby security policy compliance. Likewise, 
information security researchers could include 
required effort as an extension to prevalent security 
theories to help increase explained variance in 
behavior and mitigate the intention-behavior gap. 
Finally, our results suggest a need to examine behavior 
directly, when possible, in a security context or to 
provide estimates of required effort to follow a security 
control rather than to rely only on intentions because 
required effort may inhibit the impact of intentions on 
actual behavior.  
2 Background and Hypotheses 
Intentions are studied as a precursor of behavior. 
However, there is often an inconsistency between 
people’s intentions and their behavior. In a meta-
analysis examining the influence of intentions on 
behavior (n = 82,107), intentions were shown to 
account for, on average, 28% of the variance in 
behavior (Sheeran, 2002). In general, explaining 28% 
of the variance is often considered good. However, 28% 
of the variance is short of ideal, especially in a security 
setting where a single failure to follow a security policy 
can cause a security risk (e.g., creating a single weak 
password can make a system vulnerable). Research has 
shown that although people are concerned about their 
security and may have good intentions to protect it, 
they often do not take action to protect their 
information (Acquisti, 2004).  
Much research has examined how to strengthen 
people’s intentions to adhere to security policies 
(Moody et al., 2018). However, little research in 
information security has examined why these 
intentions are often inconsistent with people’s security 
behavior, and most of this research focuses on 
demographic moderators such as gender (e.g., Anwar 
et al., 2017). Our paper aims to identify a factor—
required effort of a security task—that may explain the 
intention-behavior gap by both directly influencing 
behavior and also moderating the intention-behavior 
relationship. In contrast to demographic-related 
moderators of the intention-behavior relationship, 
security administrators have control over many 
system-design features and security controls that 
influence required effort. If systems are not properly 
designed to minimize effort, they may “derail a 
previously formed intention” (Ortiz de Guinea & 
Markus, 2009, p. 438).  
Despite the dearth of research on the intention-
behavior gap in the security discipline, the intention-
behavior gap has been studied extensively in 
psychology and related disciplines (e.g., Gollwitzer, 
1999; Pieters & Verplanken, 1995; Schifter & Ajzen, 
1985; Sheeran, Norman, & Orbell, 1999; Sutton, 
McVey, & Glanz, 1999). We leverage and extend this 
research to mitigate the intention-behavior gap in 
information security. The literature classifies 
contributors to the intention-behavior gap roughly into 
four areas: behavior types, intention type, properties of 
intentions, and cognitive and personality variables 
(Sheeran, 2002).  
First, behavior type can influence how well intentions 
translate to behavior. Behavior type can be 
differentiated into either single actions or sustained 
behaviors/goals (i.e., behaviors that require multiple 
actions over time). Intentions are more likely to 
influence behavior for single actions than for goals that 
require multiple actions (Sheeran, 2002). For example, 
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it is more likely that intentions will influence the 
behavior of changing one’s password tomorrow (one 
action) than that of changing one’s password every 
month (multiple actions). Second, the intention type 
can influence how well intentions translate to behavior. 
Intention type can be differentiated into at least two 
types: general intentions and implementation 
intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999). General intentions are 
measured in the form of “I intend to do X.” 
Implementation intentions are measured in the form of, 
“I intend to do X, in situation Y.” For example, a 
general intention might be, “I intend to change my 
password” whereas an implementation intention might 
be, “I intend to change my password every first 
Monday of the month at 8:00 a.m.” People are more 
likely to behave as intended when specifying 
implementation intentions than when specifying 
general intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer & 
Brandstätter, 1997).  
Third, the properties of intentions may influence how 
well intentions translate into behavior (Sheeran, 2002). 
One property of intentions includes temporal 
stability—i.e., the degree to which intentions change 
prior to performing a behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1991; 
Ajzen, Brown, & Carvajal, 2004). Although the 
moderating influence of temporal stability is debated 
(e.g., Randall & Wolff, 1994), in general, one should 
measure intentions as closely as possible to the 
targeted behavior (Ajzen, 1985). Finally, cognitive and 
other personality characteristics may influence how 
well intentions translate to behavior (Sheeran, 2002). 
From a cognitive perspective, conflicting intentions or 
multiple conflicting goals may moderate the influence 
of intentions on behavior because they impede the 
performance of the focal behavior (Abraham et al., 
1999). For example, a user may have intentions to 
adhere to a security policy but may also have intentions 
to complete a task as quickly as possible. In such a 
scenario, one’s intentions to complete a task quickly 
may hinder one’s intentions to adhere to the security 
policy (Abraham et al., 1999).  
Although each category is helpful for understanding 
the intention-behavior gap in security literature, our 
study particularly contributes to the cognitive 
characteristics category. Specifically, based on Zipf’s 
law, we identify a salient, albeit often subconscious 
competing intention that may directly influence 
behavior and may also moderate the influence of 
security intentions on behavior: namely, required 
effort. Zipf’s law asserts that people have a desire to 
minimize required effort and normally choose the path 
of least resistance or the least required effort (Zipf, 
1949). Contrary to the cost-benefit paradigm, which 
suggests that people consciously assess the anticipated 
costs and benefits of performing a behavior that shapes 
their beliefs about the behavior (Hardy, 1982), Zipf’s 
law denotes a primitive, automatic process through 
which required effort influences behavior at the precise 
time of the behavior. The principle is based on the 
premise that humans have limited resources (e.g., time, 
cognitive effort, abilities, etc.) and naturally choose 
alternatives that minimize required effort, thereby 
freeing up resources for other tasks (Case, 2012). This 
natural tendency to free up resources is almost always 
present (Zipf, 1949); even if other tasks are not 
currently competing for resources, humans naturally 
free resources for future use (Case, 2012; Pashler, 
1994).  
Literature supports Zipf’s law by providing anecdotal 
evidence that the desire to minimize effort is a 
competing intention that may impact security. Through 
interviewing employees from commercial 
organizations, Adams and Sasse (1999) found that the 
actual costs (i.e., required effort) and perceived 
benefits of compliance influence actual compliance 
with security policies. Similarly, interviews have 
indicated that increasing required effort by forcing 
users to frequently change passwords decreases users’ 
motivation to comply with the security policy 
(Beautement, Sasse, & Wonham, 2008). Further, 
response costs—or the costs associated with the 
recommended behavior—have been shown to 
negatively influence intentions to protect oneself 
(Herath & Rao, 2009; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Vance, 
Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012; Workman, Bommer, & 
Straub, 2008). Perceived barriers, which may include 
the amount of required effort, may also decrease secure 
behavior (Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009).  
In summary, the desire to minimize required effort is 
an omnipresent, albeit often subconscious intention of 
users. Intentions can be viewed as someone’s self-
instructions and motivation to perform a behavior. 
When actually performing a behavior, people tend to 
follow their self-instructions to a degree, especially 
when their motivation is high (i.e., intentions are 
strong) (Sheeran & Webb, 2016). However, unlike 
many other intentions, the desire to minimize required 
effort may not be fully anticipated until one encounters 
a situation involving high levels of required effort. 
Sheeran and Webb (2016, p. 503) explain “most 
behavior is habitual or involves responses that are 
triggered automatically by situational cues.” High 
required effort is one of those situational cues that can 
heighten the intention to minimize effort. As such, high 
levels of required effort will cause people to modify 
their behaviors to decrease that effort. In summary, we 
predict: 
H1: Required effort negatively influences actual 
security policy adherence.  
In addition to the direct relationship between required 
effort and compliance behavior, we predict that 
required effort will also moderate the influence of 
users’ intentions to adhere to a security policy on the 
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resulting compliance behavior. Moderating effects are 
common in information systems research. For 
example, research has studied how IT investment 
moderates IT returns (Lim, Richardson, & Roberts, 
2004), how various factors moderate system success 
(McKeen, Guimaraes, & Wetherbe, 1994), and even 
how factors moderate the relationship between 
intentions and its antecedents (Chen, Ramamurthy, & 
Wen, 2012). However, very little research has 
examined what factors moderate the intention-
behavior relationship in a security context aside from 
demographic moderators on self-reported security 
compliance (Anwar et al., 2017). We extend this 
research to show that required effort moderates the 
influence of compliance intentions on security 
behavior. 
Simultaneous competing intentions interact, moderate, 
and influence each other (Sheeran, 2002). In a security 
setting, the desire to minimize required effort is shown 
to be often greater than intentions to achieve an optimal 
solution (e.g., Bawden & Robinson, 2009; Griffiths & 
Brophy, 2005). This means that users’ natural 
tendency to minimize required effort may inhibit one 
from fully enacting positive security intentions 
because behavior is a function of each competing 
intention and the relative importance of each intention 
(Abraham et al., 1999). In a subconscious automatic 
process, people assess each competing intention and 
attribute value (or degree of importance) to each 
intention. In some cases, people may choose a behavior 
that fulfills all competing intentions. However, in most 
cases, competing intentions conflict with each other 
(Abraham et al., 1999; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). For 
example, adhering to a security policy and minimizing 
required effort often conflict with each other (the 
former often results in additional required effort, while 
the latter calls for less required effort). 
When people have multiple conflicting intentions, the 
likelihood of any given intention fully translating into 
behavior decreases, and people engage in an 
optimization process to maximize overall value. Often, 
a satisficing approach is taken: people partially 
implement multiple intentions to maximize value 
(Simon, 1956). In this case, the relationship between 
any given intention and behavior weakens. For 
example, to reduce required effort in a security context, 
one may sufficiently fulfill both the intention to behave 
securely and the intention to minimize required effort 
by adhering to some security policies while ignoring 
others that have less perceived importance. Thus, in 
this example, the intention to behave securely would 
be selectively translated to behavior—i.e., the 
omnipresent intention to minimize required effort 
influences how well secure behavior intentions 
translate to behavior. Furthermore, when effort 
increases, people generally have a greater desire to 
decrease effort (i.e., the competing intention to 
minimize effort becomes more salient) (Zipf, 1949). 
As such, under circumstances requiring high effort, 
positive intentions to adhere to the security policy are 
less likely to translate into behavior than when the 
required effort is lower. In summary, we hypothesize 
the following: 
H2: Required effort negatively moderates the 
relationship between the intentions of adhering 
to a security policy and actual security policy 
adherence. 
Some research suggests that, in prevalent theory, 
perceived behavioral control (PBC)—i.e., the 
perceived degree of control a person has over factors 
that may interfere with the execution of an intended 
action—entails effort. For example, researchers have 
described PBC as “people’s perception of the ease or 
difficulty of performing the behavior of interest” 
(Ajzen, 1991, p. 183), a “person’s perception of how 
easy or difficult it would be to carry out a behavior” 
(Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006, p. 119), and “a set of 
control beliefs” (Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006, p. 117). 
However, all of these definitions refer to a perception 
or belief of control, while the required (or actual) effort 
of completing a task is largely ignored in theoretical 
models. In reality, several factors make it difficult, if 
not impossible, to accurately perceive or estimate the 
amount of control and effort required to complete 
security tasks, meriting separate treatment of PBC and 
required effort. We summarize these factors next.  
First, people are inherently unskilled at estimating their 
own abilities and the amount of required effort needed 
to complete a task (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Hence, 
users’ efforts in a security context are often fraught 
with failure caused by overestimating abilities and 
underestimating required effort. Inaccurately 
estimating abilities and required effort is often caused 
by people lacking the appropriate expertise or 
metacognition to assess a scenario. Particularly in a 
security setting, this is problematic because most 
computer users are nonexperts who lack even basic 
privacy and cybersecurity knowledge (e.g., Smith, 
2016; Ur et al., 2016; Wash & Rader, 2015). Ur et al. 
(2015) explained that attaining accurate knowledge of 
computer security is very hard for everyday users 
because their decisions can be difficult to execute 
correctly and the outcomes of their behaviors are not 
always visible. 
Second, when considering the amount of required 
effort that something might involve, people often 
underestimate or do not fully anticipate what other 
competing intentions are present in a security context 
(e.g., work demands and time pressures). Security is 
often a secondary task of using computers. In other 
words, people do not normally use a computer for the 
sake of being secure. Rather, people use computers to 
complete their everyday jobs, socialize, and be 
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entertained. Even when security is a high priority, it 
often interferes and is interfered with by these other 
tasks (Jenkins et al., 2016). Normally, people are not 
aware of demands interfering with each other unless 
these demands are highly difficult or physically 
incompatible. Hence, it might seem that only high-
cognitive demands decrease security policy adherence; 
however, studies have demonstrated that the opposite 
is true. Demands can interfere with each other quite 
drastically, even when they are neither highly 
challenging nor physically incompatible (Pashler, 
1994). This finding is especially true in a security 
setting (e.g., Anwar et al., 2017; Bravo-Lillo et al., 
2011; Jenkins et al., 2016).  
Accurately assessing control and effort is very difficult 
because users lack security knowledge and often do not 
anticipate competing demands when performing 
security behaviors. This difficulty in assessing control 
and effort exemplifies the need to separately measure 
required effort and PBC when predicting security 
behavior. In summary, we predict that required effort 
is still a meaningful significant factor when predicting 
behavior, even after controlling for PBC. H3 is 
summarized below and all the hypotheses are 
graphically summarized in Figure 1. 
H3: After controlling for the effect of PBC on actual 
security policy adherence, the (a) main effect of 
required effort and (b) the moderating effect of 
required effort on intentions will still be 
significant predictors of actual security policy 
adherence.
 
Figure 1. Summary of Hypotheses 
3 Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted three 
experiments. The first two experiments measured 
users’ adherence to a password security policy. In 
Experiment 1, we manipulated effort using a single 
sign-on versus a multiple sign-on scenario. In 
Experiment 2, we manipulated effort using a single-
factor authentication versus a multifactor 
authentication scenario. Experiment 3 measured users’ 
adherence to an information disclosure policy. In this 
experiment, we manipulated effort by either (1) 
requiring participants to memorize the information 
disclosure policy (the high-effort treatment) or (2) 
using just-in-time information to remind participants 
about relevant policy information as it was needed (the 
low-effort treatment). The experiments are described 
in the following sections.  
3.1 Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we examined the influence of 
required effort—manipulated as a single sign-on 
versus a multiple sign-on scenario—on users’ 
compliance with their organizations’ password 
security policy. Single sign-on refers to the ability to 
access all resources in an organization through a single 
set of credentials (one username and password). 
Multiple sign-on refers to a situation in which each 
subsystem within an organization requires its own set 
of credentials. Because multiple sign-on requires users 
to create several passwords, it requires greater effort. 
We designed the experiment so that participants 
interacted with a typical organizational environment 
that required them to work with several systems to 
complete a given task. We asked the participants to act 
as new employees at a company. Upon arriving at the 
experiment site, they participated in a new-employee 
orientation and were introduced to their first task: 
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completing a financial summary report. All 
participants watched a training video (a five-minute 
narrated PowerPoint presentation) that explained the 
importance of security for the organization and 
instructed participants on how to create strong 
passwords. We adapted the training materials for 
creating passwords based on a password policy from 
the SANS Institute,1 a recognized authority on security 
training and standards. We also provided participants 
with a written copy of the company’s security policy 
(summarized in Table 1). After they watched the 
training video and reviewed the security policy (further 
described in Appendix C), the participants completed 
a short assessment to determine comprehension and to 
capture the measures described in Section 3.1.1 of the 
current paper. 
After the new employee orientation, participants began 
compiling their financial reports by following a printed 
set of instructions. The task required participants to 
access several internal systems in the organization 
(e.g., a Wiki, email, and a document repository). In the 
single sign-on group, participants created one 
password for their Windows workstation, which gave 
them access to all other subsystems. In the multiple 
sign-on group, users had to create a unique password 
for each subsystem in the organization, resulting in the 
need for three different passwords to complete their 
financial reports. Once participants finished compiling 
their financial reports, they emailed the reports to their 
manager. The duration of the entire task was about 30 
minutes. The systems captured, anonymized, and 
automatically analyzed the degree to which users 
adhered to the password policy by following the 
procedures described in Section 3.1.2.  
3.1.1 Independent Variables  
We coded required effort as a binary variable based on 
the treatment group (“1” for the high-required effort 
treatment group and “0” for the low-required effort 
treatment group). We measured intentions and PBC (as 
a control variable) through a pre-survey that used 
validated instruments in an information-systems 
context originally from Ajzen (1991) and further 
refined by Taylor and Todd (1995) and Bulgurcu, 
Cavusoglu, and Benbasat (2010). Prior to answering 
these items, participants again reviewed the security 
policy. Appendix A lists the instruments. We adapted 
the measures specifically to our context, as 
recommended by D’Arcy and Herath (2011) and 
measurement and security experts reviewed them to 
ensure face and content validity. Furthermore, we 
tested the items in a pilot study and we made minor 
adjustments to improve clarity. We also collected 
several other control variables that represent the salient 
differences among the participants, including age, 
gender, years of education, nationality, and major. 
3.1.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable we used was compliance with 
the password policy. The security policy contained five 
criteria for strong passwords. For each criterion, users 
received a score that ranged between 0 and 1, with a 
score of 5 indicating total compliance across the five 
criteria (see Table 1). The score for the single sign-on 
group was the score for the single password created. 
The score for the multiple sign-on group was the 
average score for the three different passwords created. 
Table 1. Scoring Criteria for Compliance with Security Policy 
# Criteria Score 
1 Passwords should contain at least 15 characters. 
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑
15
 = 0…1  
2 Passwords should contain both upper- and lowercase letters. 
1 if password contains upper- and lowercase letters; 0 if 
it does not  
3 Passwords should contain at least one special character. 
1 if password contains at least one special character; 0 if 
it does not 
4 Passwords should contain at least one number. 
1 if password contains at least one number; 0 if it does 
not 
5 Passwords should not contain words found in a dictionary. 
1 if password does not contain words found in a 
dictionary; 0 if it does  
We used the following dictionaries: English, Spanish, 
French, German, Russian, Urban, Common Names, 
Movie Characters 









We recruited students to participate in the experiment 
and offered extra credit for participating in the study. 
A total of 86 students (60% male) participated in 
Experiment 1. The three most represented majors were 
management information systems (MIS) (56%), 
MIS/operations management (17%), and pre-business 
(15%). Approximately 58% of participants were 18-22 
years old. The two most represented nationalities were 
American (64%) and Chinese (13%). Six of the 
participants did not pass the security policy 
comprehension assessment and were removed from the 
dataset, resulting in 80 usable data points.  
3.1.4 Data Analysis and Results 
Prior to our analysis, we assessed the validity and 
reliability of the instruments, which are reported in 
Appendix B. PBC and intentions served as reflective 
measures; therefore, we validated the convergent and 
discriminant validity and reliability of the 
measurement scales through a factor analysis as well 
as through construct correlations and cross-
correlations for both experiments. All the loadings for 
each item on its latent construct exceeded 0.6. The 
average variance extracted from all constructs was 
much larger than 0.5; therefore, good convergent 
validity was demonstrated (Anderson & Gerbing, 
1988). In addition, all square roots of the average 
variance extracted exceeded the correlation 
coefficients between constructs, thereby 
demonstrating good discriminant validity (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). Correlations among the independent 
variables were less than 0.65 (Billings & Wroten, 
1978), and the VIF was below 5 (Kutner, Nachtsheim, 
& Neter, 2004); hence, multicollinearity was not 
deemed to be a problem. Finally, all of the Cronbach’s 
alpha scores were above 0.7, suggesting good internal 
consistency (Billings & Wroten, 1978).  
Next, we performed a manipulation check on our 
treatment using a self-reported measure of effort that 
was collected in the post-survey (measure adapted 
from Wang & Benbasat, 2009). We conducted an 
independent sample t-test to verify that the two 
different conditions successfully manipulated effort. 
We found that the high-required effort group (the 
multiple sign-on group) reported significantly higher 
effort than the low-required effort group: t(73.402) = 
3.362, p < 0.01. Table 2 displays the means and 
standard deviations for compliance and self-reported 
effort for each treatment. 
The next step was a regression analysis. First, we 
specified a model with all independent, dependent, and 
control variables. Required effort was included as a 
factor of whether someone had multiple sign-on or a 
single sign-on. None of the control variables were 
significant (p > 0.05 for all paths from the control 
variables to compliance). Therefore, we specified a 
second model, omitting the control variables (Kenny, 
2011) other than PBC so that we could test H3. Table 
3 shows the results of the regression and Figure 2 
summarizes them. For comparison, we also specified a 
competing model without the effect of required effort. 
Table 4 displays the R-squared for our hypothesized 
model and the competing model. We conducted a 
Wald test to examine whether the hypothesized model 
explained more variance than the competing model. 
The test indicated a significant difference between the 
two models: 2(2) = 94.74, p < 0.0001. 
The significant interactions are plotted in Figure 3. 
This graph displays the compliance with the security 
policy at each intention level for both the high-required 
effort treatment and the low-required effort treatment 
with error bars. As the graph shows, people in the high- 
required effort treatment displayed lower compliance 
as intentions increased. 
Table 2. Experiment 1 Password Compliance Means and Standard Deviations  
Group # of participants Compliance mean (sd) Self-reported effort (sd) 
Multiple sign-on (high required effort) 42 1.701 (1.091) 5.645 (0.880) 
Single sign-on (low required effort) 38 3.361 (0.721) 4.833 (1.262) 
Table 3. Experiment 1 Regression Analysis Results 
 Estimate SE T-Value P-Value 
(Intercept) (1.374) 0.855 (1.608) 0.112 
Perceived behavioral 
control 0.085 0.071 1.200 0.234 
Intentions 0.743 0.143 5.208 0.000 
Required effort 1.148 0.986 1.164 0.248 
Required 
effort*Intentions (0.478) 0.170 (2.811) 0.006 
Note: Adjusted R-squared: 0.625 
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Table 4. Experiment 1 Model R-Squared 
 
Proposed model Model without required 
effort 




0.625 0.374 0.669 (large) 
Note: * Effect size (ƒ²) is calculated by the formula (R2full – R
2
partial) / (1 – R
2
full). Cohen (1988) suggested 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 as operational 
definitions of small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively. 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1 Summary Model Results 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 1 Interaction Plot 
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3.2 Experiment 2 Task and Procedure 
To increase the generalizability to other authentication 
contexts, Experiment 2 manipulated required effort 
through single- versus multifactor authentication. In 
Experiment 2, participants were asked to engage in a 
consulting task for an e-commerce organization. All 
participants watched a training video (the same five-
minute narrated PowerPoint presentation as in 
Experiment 1 [see Appendix C], which was viewed 0-
26 days prior to the experiment) that explained the 
importance of security for the organization and taught 
participants how to create strong passwords. 
Participants were also given a written copy of the 
company’s security policy (see Table 1 for a 
summary). After they watched the training video and 
reviewed the security policy, the participants were 
required to complete a short assessment to determine 
comprehension and to measure intentions, PBC, and 
required effort, which are outlined in Section 3.2.1. 
Then, we asked participants to schedule a session in 
the computer lab to complete their consulting tasks, 
which involved assessing online inventory and 
ordering supplies for the company through an online 
vendor. The entire task lasted approximately 45 
minutes. 
Upon arriving at the computer lab, participants were 
randomly assigned to either a single-factor 
authentication treatment or a multifactor 
authentication treatment. During the task, participants 
were required to create an account at a vendor’s 
website and then order new inventory. The single-
factor authentication treatment allowed users to create 
one username and password to access the vendor 
website; however, the multifactor authentication 
treatment required participants to configure a token 
and then create a password. In the first step, users had 
to configure their token for the authentication context. 
This included entering at least two of the token’s codes 
on a configuration page (the code changed every 60 
seconds) and then saving backup codes. In the second 
step, users had to create a password to accompany the 
token. Each time they logged into the vendor’s website 
thereafter (which users had to do multiple times during 
the experiment regardless of their treatment group), 
they entered both their password and a PIN number 
from the token. The PIN number changed every 60 
seconds and was synchronized with the vendor’s 
website. Because the multifactor authentication 
treatment required an extra step to create passwords 
and authenticate, it required greater effort.  
3.2.1 Independent Variables 
Required effort was coded as a binary variable in the 
model based on the treatment group (“1” for the high-
required effort treatment group and “0” for the low- 
required effort treatment group). The same instruments 
from Experiment 1 were used to measure intentions, 
PBC, and the other control variables. We also 
controlled for the length between participants’ security 
training and the actual experiment, which was a 
duration of 0-26 days. 
3.2.2 Dependent Variable 
Because the participants in both treatments created 
their own passwords, password information was 
extracted and anonymized to protect user privacy. 
Compliance with the security policy was calculated 
using the same procedure outlined in Experiment 1. 
3.2.3 Participants 
A total of 157 subjects participated in the experiment. 
Students from a large US public university were 
recruited to complete the experiment for class credit. 
The students averaged 3.8 years of college education, 
54% of the participants were male, and the average age 
was 23. The four most represented majors for the 
participants were accounting (15%), management 
information systems (15%), marketing (13%), and 
finance (11%); 61% of the participants were American, 
12% Indian, 8% Mexican, 8% Chinese, and 11% other. 
Ten of the participants did not pass the security policy 
comprehension assessment and were removed from the 
dataset, resulting in 147 usable data points. 
3.2.4 Data Analysis and Results 
Consistent with Experiment 1, we assessed the validity 
and reliability of our survey measures and found them 
to be both valid and reliable (see Appendix B). Again, 
to ensure that the treatments achieved their desired 
effects, we conducted manipulation checks. All 
participants rated the perceived effort of authenticating 
during the post-survey (measure adapted from Wang 
& Benbasat, 2009). Participants in the multifactor 
treatment ranked the self-reported effort significantly 
higher than participants in the single-factor treatment: 
t(138) = 3.092, p < 0.01. Table 5 displays the means 
and standard deviations for compliance for each group. 
Next, we conducted a regression analysis to test our 
hypotheses. We specified a model with all 
independent, dependent, and control variables. 
Required effort was included as a factor whether 
participants used multiple-factor authentication or 
single-factor authentication. Like in Experiment 1, 
none of the control variables were found to be 
significant (p > 0.05 for all paths from the control 
variables to compliance), except for the length of time 
between participants’ security training and the actual 
experiment. Therefore, we specified a second model, 
omitting all the control variables except for days since 
training and PBC so that we could test H3. Table 6 and 
Figure 4 show the results of this model. For 
comparison, we also specified a competing model 
without required effort included. Table 7 displays the 
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R-squared for our hypothesized model and the 
competing model. We conducted a Wald test to 
examine whether the hypothesized model explained 
more variance than the competing model. The test 
indicated a significant difference between the two 
models: 2(2) = 43.524, p < 0.0001 
The significant interactions are plotted in Figure 5. 
This graph displays compliance with the security 
policy at each intention level for both the high-required 
effort treatment and the low-required effort treatment 
using error bars. As shown by the graph, individuals in 
the high-required effort treatment group displayed 
lower compliance as intentions increased. 
Table 5. Experiment 2 Password Compliance Means and Standard Deviations  
Group # of participants Compliance mean (sd) Self-reported effort (sd) 
Multifactor authentication (high required effort) 74 2.775 (0.744) 5.710 (0.907) 
Single-factor authentication (low required effort) 73 3.603 (0.799 5.180 (1.157) 
Table 6. Experiment 2 Regression Analysis Results 
 Estimate SE T-Value P-Value 
(Intercept) 1.609 0.562 2.865 0.005 
Days since training (0.032) 0.008 (3.998) 0.000 
Perceived behavioral 
control (0.021) 0.057 (0.374) 0.709 
Intentions 0.402 0.094 4.290 0.000 
Required effort 1.120 0.611 1.834 0.069 
Intentions*Required 
effort (0.317) 0.105 (3.015) 0.003 
Note: Adjusted R-squared: 0.379 
Table 7. Experiment 2 Model R-Squared  
 




0.379 0.178 0.324 (medium) 
Note: * Effect size (ƒ²) is calculated by the formula (R2full – R
2
partial) / (1 – R
2
full). Cohen (1988) suggested 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 as operational 
definitions of small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively. 
 
Figure 4. Experiment 2 Summary Model Results 




Figure 5. Experiment 2 Interaction Plot 
3.3 Experiment 3 Task and Procedure 
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to determine whether 
the results of the prior experiments could be generalized 
to a context outside of password compliance—namely 
users’ compliance with the organization’s information 
disclosure policy. Participants were told that they were 
completing a remote consulting project for clients. They 
could complete the task on their own time and on their 
own computers. The entire task required approximately 
30 minutes.  
In the experiment, each participant consulted for a client 
and was required to adhere to an information disclosure 
policy from the client. All participants were given the 
policy at the beginning of the study and were asked to 
report their intentions and PBC regarding adherence to 
the policy. The policy explained why information 
disclosure about clients was prohibited, what their 
responsibility was to protect client information, and why 
they should never disclose client information (e.g., 
names, contact information, etc.) to third parties (see 
Appendix C). Required effort was manipulated by either 
(1) requiring participants to memorize the information 
policy at that time (the high-required effort treatment) or 
(2) using just-in-time prompts during the experiment to 
remind participants about relevant policy information as 
it was needed (the low-required effort treatment). The 
participants were then given a short quiz on the material 
to ensure comprehension and were then allowed to 
download a copy of the policy for future reference.  
After receiving the information disclosure policy, 
participants were given their first consulting task: to 
evaluate and recommend a printer for their client. They 
were given instructions regarding how to evaluate 
printers and to make a recommendation for their client. 
All participants were then given the contact information 
about their first client (e.g., name, phone number, 
contact person, etc.) and instructed to complete the task.  
During one part of the task, participants visited two 
printer vendor websites to complete their evaluations. 
Both websites were created by the research team but 
participants were unaware of this. If the participants 
were in the low-required effort condition, they were 
shown a prompt just before visiting each vendors’ 
website, reminding them to not disclose information 
about clients to third parties. Participants in the high-
required effort condition did not receive this prompt. On 
each website, the users interacted with a sales 
representative using a chat window to obtain 
information about the printer (e.g., price, service 
options). Unbeknownst to the participants, the sales 
representative was an automated bot. The bot first asked 
participants: “Hi, my name is Kelly. What product 
would you like information for?” After the participants 
entered the product description, the sales representative 
asked: “I would be happy to help. First, may I ask who 
you are buying the printer for?” Irrespective of the 
participants’ answers to this question, the sales 
representative then provided them with the printer 
information they requested. Participants’ interactions 
with the sales representative were logged and, 
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afterward, two research assistants manually reviewed 
each interaction to determine whether client information 
was disclosed. Given the simplicity of the coding, we 
observed no discrepancies in coding. 
3.3.1 Independent Variables 
Required effort was coded as a binary variable in the 
model based on the treatment group (“1” for the high-
required effort treatment group and “0” for the low-
required effort treatment group). When participants 
were shown the information on the disclosure policy, 
they also reported their PBC and intentions (as a 
control variable) to obey the information disclosure 
policy (see Appendix A for instruments). We also 
captured additional control variables related to 
participant demographics as done in Experiment 1.  
3.3.2 Dependent Variable 
Security policy adherence was operationalized as 
unauthorized information disclosure—that is, whether 
participants disclosed sensitive client information. 
Information disclosure was coded as “1” if participants 
disclosed sensitive information to the automated 
chatbot and “0” if they did not.  
3.3.3 Participants 
A total of 156 students participated in the experiment 
and were given extra credit for participating. The four 
most represented majors for participants were 
accounting (11%), energy management (8%), finance 
(7%), and marketing (6%). The average age of 
participants was 22, 63% of the participants were male, 
and participants had an average of 2.2 years of higher 
education. Nationalities represented were 80% 
American, 4% Mexican, and 16% other. All 
participants passed the security policy comprehension 
assessment.  
3.3.4 Data Analysis and Results 
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, we assessed the 
validity and reliability of our survey measures and 
found them to be both valid and reliable (see Appendix 
B). Again, to ensure that the treatments achieved their 
desired effects, we conducted manipulation checks. 
During the post-survey, all participants ranked their 
self-reported effort of adhering to the security policy 
during the post-survey (measure adapted from Wang 
& Benbasat, 2009). Participants in the just-in-time 
reminder treatment ranked their self-reported effort 
significantly lower than participants in the no just-in-
time reminders treatment: t(128.85) = 2.210, p < 0.05. 
See Table 8 for a summary of the statistics.  
Next, we conducted a logistic regression analysis to 
test our hypotheses. First, we specified a model with 
all independent, dependent, and control variables. 
Required effort was included as a factor indicating 
whether a participant had a reminder or did not have a 
reminder and had to memorize the policy. As in the 
previous experiments, none of the control variables 
were found to be significant (p > 0.05 for all paths from 
the control variables to compliance). Therefore, we 
specified a second model, omitting all of the control 
variables except for PBC so that we could test H3. 
Table 9 and Figure 6 show the results of this model. 
For comparison, we also specified a competing model 
without the effect of required effort. Table 10 displays 
the R-squared for our hypothesized model and the 
competing model. We conducted a Wald test to 
examine whether the hypothesized model explained 
more variance than the competing model. The test 
indicated a significant difference between the two 
models: 2(2) = 24.115, p < 0.0001. 
The significant interactions are plotted in Figure 7. 
This graph displays the compliance with the 
information disclosure policy at each intention level 
for both the high-required effort treatment and the low- 
required effort treatment using error bars. As the graph 
shows, individuals in the high-required effort 
treatment group displayed lower compliance as 
intentions increased.
Table 8. Experiment 3 Disclosure Compliance Means and Standard Deviations 
Group # of participants # compliant (percentage) Self-reported required 
effort (sd) 
No just-in-time reminders (high required effort) 77 40 (50.649%) 5.300 (0.863) 
Just-in-time reminders (low required effort) 79 71 (89.873%) 4.898 (1.347) 
Table 9. Experiment 3 Logistic Regression Analysis Results 
 Estimate SE T-Value P-Value 
(Intercept) (4.488) 2.069 (2.169) 0.030 
Perceived behavioral control 0.420 0.244 1.720 0.085 
Intentions 0.712 0.295 2.414 0.016 
Required effort 2.462 2.357 1.045 0.296 
Required effort*Intentions (0.794) 0.394 (2.017) 0.043 
Note: Pseudo R-squared: 0.254 
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Table 10. Experiment 3 Model Fit Indices  
 
Proposed Model Model without Effect Effect size of adding required effort relationships* 
Pseudo R-squared 
compliance  
0.254 0.072 0.244 (medium) 
 
Figure 6. Experiment 3 Summary Model Results 
 
Figure 7. Experiment 3 Interaction Plot 
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Table 11. Summary of Results 
Hypothesis Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
H1: Required effort negatively influences actual 
security policy adherence. 
Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H2: Required effort negatively moderates the 
relationship between the intentions of adhering to a 
security policy and actual security policy adherence. 
Supported Supported Supported 
H3a: After controlling for the effect of PBC on actual 
security policy adherence, the main effect of required 
effort will still be a significant predictor of actual 
security policy adherence. 
Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H3b: After controlling for the effect of PBC on actual 
security policy adherence, the moderating effect of 
required effort on intentions will still be a significant 
predictor of actual security policy adherence. 
Supported Supported Supported 
4 Discussion 
The purpose of the current research was to investigate 
how required effort moderates the intention-behavior 
relationship in the context of users’ adherence to 
security policies. We developed hypotheses based on 
Zipf’s law, asserting that users have a competing 
intention to minimize effort, and then tested them in 
three experiments. The results of the three experiments 
confirm that intentions influence behavior. Although 
required effort does not significantly influence 
behavior directly (H1 was not supported), it negatively 
moderates the influence of intentions on behavior (H2 
was supported). In addition, after controlling for the 
effect of PBC on actual security policy adherence, the 
moderating effect of required effort on intentions was 
a strong predictor of actual security policy adherence 
(H3a was not supported, but H3b was supported). The 
nonsignificant effect of effort directly on behavior (H1 
and H3a) should be interpreted within the context of 
the moderating effect; effort significantly moderated 
the influence of intentions on behavior and, through 
this mechanism, influenced behavior. The results of 
the hypotheses in all three experiments are 
summarized in Table 11. In the following sections, we 
discuss the implications of these results for research 
and practice. 
4.1 Implications for Research 
This research provides several novel insights into the 
intention-behavior gap in the context of users’ 
adherence to security policies. Given the importance of 
positive intentions translating to security compliance, 
it is critical that research looks beyond predicting 
intentions to better understand behavior and, 
specifically, what factors influence whether intentions 
predict security compliance. We address this gap in the 
literature by extending theory in psychology on the 
intention-behavior gap and Zipf’s law to theoretically 
and empirically show how required effort moderates 
the relationship between intentions and behavior. Also, 
we contribute to the broader intention-behavior gap 
literature by identifying a salient competing intention 
in the security context: namely, required effort.  
Importantly, our findings have broad impacts on 
understanding security compliance. The use of 
intentions to understand security compliance is 
prevalent in theory and literature. Intentions are used 
as a dependent variable in many behavioral theories 
utilized in security research, including but not limited 
to the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), 
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975), and 
several variants of deterrence theory (D’Arcy & 
Herath, 2011). Our research potentially extends all of 
these different theories in a security context. Namely, 
relevant to all of these theories, we show that the 
influence of required effort is not captured in people’s 
intentions to adhere to security policies. Rather, the 
amount of required effort negatively moderates the 
influence of intentions on behavior and can be included 
in these various theories to improve consistency 
between intentions and behavior. The effect of 
required effort is distinct from competing constructs 
such as PBC. As a result, even when people know of a 
given security control and have good intentions of 
adhering to best security practices related to the 
control, their actual behavior may deviate from their 
intentions due to their innate desire to minimize effort.  
One important implication of our findings is that they 
suggest that researchers should consider competing 
intentions, where possible, to better understand 
security behaviors. In our study, in addition to 
measuring participants’ intentions to adhere to a 
security policy, we measured actual effort as a 
surrogate for an omnipresent competing intention to 
minimize effort in a security context. By accounting 
for the moderating effect of effort on adherence 
intentions, the R-squared increased from 0.374 to 
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0.625 (an increase of 0.251, or 67%) in Experiment 1. 
Furthermore, security compliance decreased by 
approximately 49% (from 3.361 to 1.701) when the 
required effort was higher. Likewise, in Experiment 2, 
the R-squared increased from 0.178 to 0.379 (an 
increase of 0.201, or 113%). In this experiment, 
security compliance decreased by approximately 23% 
when the required effort was higher (from 3.603 to 
2.775). In Experiment 3, the R-squared increased from 
0.072 to 0.254 (an increase of 0.182, or 253%). Despite 
these encouraging results, the majority of theories 
utilized in behavioral information security measure a 
single intention when trying to predict an outcome. 
Our results suggest that when trying to understand a 
behavioral phenomenon, it would be helpful to identify 
and account for various competing intentions to predict 
security-related behavior. Also, given that our 
experiment had only two levels of effort (high and 
low), future research should investigate whether there 
are any breakpoints or, potentially, a curvilinear 
relationship between security compliance and required 
effort.  
We recommend that future research identify which 
other competing intentions (conscious or 
subconscious) may also moderate the intention-
behavior relationship in security settings—e.g., the 
intention to complete a task quickly, turnover 
intention, or intention to help a colleague. Karjalainen, 
Sarker, and Siponen (2019) have argued that 
competing intentions (labeled as tensions) can stem 
from four different areas: environmental confidence 
(openness/trust vs. suspicion), level of goals and 
interests prioritized (individual vs. institutional), 
motivational drivers (instrumental vs. 
socioemotional), and time horizon (immediate vs. 
long-term focus). We empirically examined a variable 
in one of these areas (level of goals and interests 
prioritized) and found that it had a significant impact 
on security policy compliance. Future research should 
empirically investigate variables in these other areas to 
identify the relevant competing intentions that may 
affect security policy compliance and thus better 
predict actual security behavior.  
Our empirical findings provide some interesting 
observations regarding how effort moderates 
intentions. Specifically, the main effect of required 
effort was not significant in any of the experiments; 
only the interaction was significant. Upon examination 
of the interaction plots for each experiment (Figure 3, 
Figure 5, and Figure 7), it became clear that effort had 
the largest effect on people with positive intentions, 
whereas individuals with lower intentions were not 
influenced to the same degree. Future research is 
needed to better understand this. One potential 
explanation supported by our results is that people with 
low intentions anticipate the extra work of adhering to 
the security policy and thus admit they do not intend to 
strictly follow it, whereas people with high intentions 
have a positively biased view of security compliance 
and do not consider other side effects of behaving 
securely when reporting intentions (e.g., required 
effort). In a future study, researchers could confirm 
whether this is the case by explaining the pros and cons 
(e.g., effort) of adhering to security policies prior to 
asking people about their intentions; researchers could 
then determine whether reported intentions were better 
aligned with behavior.  
Finally, we stress the need for researchers to measure 
actual security behavior when possible because 
measuring intentions to behave securely may not 
adequately predict actual security behavior in the 
presence of other competing intentions. Consistent 
with much past research, the results of our controlled 
studies support that intentions generally improve 
behavior (e.g., Shropshire, Warkentin, & Sharma, 
2015). However, even in our studies, intentions alone 
were far from a perfect predictor of security behavior. 
Thus, we echo the observations in non-controlled 
settings that attitudes and intentions are often 
inconsistent with behavior (Acquisti, 2004). Hence, 
measuring behavior directly is often desirable in order 
to understand the state of security in an organization. 
The need to measure actual security behavior is valid 
even in scenarios where users are quite familiar with 
the security behavior in question. For example, both of 
our studies were conducted using very common 
scenarios—password creation and information 
disclosure. It is likely that every participant had prior 
experience creating passwords and keeping 
information confidential (Kaur & Mustafa, 2019). 
Despite people’s familiarity with these two tasks, 
intentions alone only predicted a minority of variance 
in behavior. Hence, for many security scenarios, 
relying on intentions alone to understand behavior is 
likely inadequate. Rather, a measure of actual behavior 
is often needed in addition to a measure of intentions.  
4.2 Implications for Practice 
Practitioners as well as researchers frequently consider 
users to be the weakest link in security (e.g., Boss et 
al., 2009). Security managers often attempt to 
strengthen this weakest link by implementing a variety 
of security controls. In the current study, we 
investigated three frequently applied security controls. 
We found that if companies try to solve the “weakest 
link” problem by using controls that have high levels 
of required effort, they may actually weaken the 
weakest link rather than strengthen it. Our results 
indicate that even employees who have positive 
intentions toward behaving securely do not always act 
on these beliefs due to burdensome technology policies 
or mechanisms. Thus, IT security managers should 
carefully consider the proposed benefits of security 
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controls and the potential side effects caused by high 
levels of required effort. 
Our research has shown that there is a differential 
effect of required effort, in addition to self-reported 
PBC, that a user can express via a survey. We suggest 
that although employees are likely not skilled at 
estimating their behavioral control for a security task, 
the required effort it takes to perform a task can be 
roughly estimated and thus can be much better 
managed. At a minimum, one could perform a 
comparative analysis that indicates which controls 
require more effort than other controls if a precise 
estimate of required effort is not available. The role of 
the actual measurement of required effort cannot be 
underestimated because this required effort moderates 
the relationship between end users’ intentions to 
behave securely and their actual behavior.  
4.3 Limitations 
Our research is subject to several limitations. First, 
Experiments 1 and 2 studied adherence to password 
policies without technology enforcement of the 
password policies. This might have created an 
environment that does not mimic best practices for 
password policy enforcement; however, current 
industry research has shown that although most 
organizations have password policies, half of them do 
not enforce them (Henderson, 2017). According to 
OneLogin, less than half (49%) of respondents 
required their internal users to follow a basic password 
complexity policy (Henderson, 2017). To minimize 
this potential limitation, we also performed an 
experiment using a different type of security policy 
adherence, namely information disclosure. We found 
that our results were consistent across these two 
security policy types and thus believe that this 
limitation did not significantly influence the validity of 
Experiments 1 and 2. We recommend that future 
research explore the scope of the current study’s 
generalizability (e.g., backing up data, installing virus 
protection software, etc.).  
Second, we employed an experimental design. When a 
balance between generalizability, realism, and 
precision is required, it is not possible to maximize one 
without compromising the other two (McGrath, 1981). 
In the context of laboratory experiments, precision is 
strong, but the experiments may often lack 
generalizability and realism. Field studies tend to 
maximize realism at the expense of generalizability 
and precision. Thus, “no one method is better or worse 
than any other; they are simply better at some aspects 
and worse at others” (Dennis & Valacich, 2001, p. 5). 
To accomplish the objective of the current study—to 
understand the moderating influence of required effort 
on the relationship between intentions and security 
policy adherence—precision and a laboratory 
experiment were arguably the most appropriate 
methodologies for an initial investigation; however, 
we suggest that future research improve the realism 
factor by testing our hypotheses in a field study.  
Finally, the results of the present study are only 
generalizable to college-age student samples. 
Although student subjects are often viewed as an 
accurate representation of newly hired employees 
(Greenburg, 1987), a more diverse sample that 
includes industry professionals should be used to allow 
generalization to a larger population of new 
employees.  
5 Conclusion 
The objective of the current paper was to explore the 
intention-behavior gap in the context of users’ 
adherence to security policies—specifically, how 
required effort moderates the relationship between 
intentions and actual security behavior. Based on 
Zipf’s law, we contribute to the literature by explaining 
how users’ desires to minimize required effort is a 
salient competing intention in a security setting and by 
empirically testing how required effort moderates the 
influence of intentions on actual security policy 
adherence. Our results indicate that required effort is a 
very meaningful moderator of the intention-behavior 
relationship in a security setting, and practitioners 
should carefully consider the trade-off between 
increased control and high levels of required effort. 
Failure to do so has the potential to make the weakest 
link in an organization’s tech-security realm even 
weaker.  
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Appendix A: Survey Instruments 
For Experiments 1 and 2, participants were given a summary of the password policy and were then asked questions 
about their beliefs and intentions to follow the policy (Table A1).  
Table A1. Item Description for Experiments 1 and 2 
Items Dimensions Scale Source 
Intro 
This corporation’s password policy requires that all of your passwords adhere to the following guidelines: 
Should be 15 or more characters 
Contain both upper- and lowercase letters (e.g., a-z, A-Z)  
Have at least one digit (0-9) 
Have at least one special character (e.g., !@#$%^&*()_+|~-) 
Are not words found in a dictionary (e.g., normal words, common names, or a word or number pattern like 
aaabbb, qwerty, zyxwvuts, 123321, etc.) 
INT 
Intentions to comply with the password policy 
I intend to comply with the requirements of the password policy for this 
organization. 
a 
(Bulgurcu et al., 
2010) 
I intend to create passwords according to the requirements of the password 
policy of this organization. 
I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the password policy 
for this organization when I create passwords. 
PBC 
Perceived behavioral control 




(Taylor & Todd, 
1995) 
Creating strong passwords per the password policy is entirely within my 
control. 
I have the resources and the knowledge and the ability to create strong 
passwords per the password policy. 
E 
Manipulation check: self-reported effort  
Authenticating was very frustrating. 
b 
(adapted from Wang 
& Benbasat, 2009) 
Using this system, I could easily authenticate. (R) 
Authenticating took too much time. 
Authenticating was easy. (R) 
Authenticating required too much effort. 
Authenticating was too complex. 
Note: * reversed coded items (noted with an R in the item text) were recoded to be consistent with the other items.   
            Scales: a. 1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree 
b. 0 = Strongly Disagree; 10 = Strongly Agree  
c. 1 = Almost Never; 2 = Very Rarely; 3 = Rarely; 4 = Occasionally; 5 = Frequently; 6 = Very Frequently; 7 = Almost 
Always 
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For Experiment 3, participants were given a summary of the information disclosure policy and were then asked 
questions about their beliefs and intentions to follow the policy (Table A2).  
Table A2. Item Description for Experiment 3 
Items Dimensions Scale Source 
INT 
Intentions to adhere to the information disclosure policy 
I intend to comply with the requirements of the information disclosure 
policy for this organization. 
a 
(Bulgurcu et al., 
2010) 
I intend to share information only according to the requirements of the 
information disclosure policy of this organization. 
I intend to carry out my responsibilities prescribed in the information 
disclosure policy for this organization. 
PBC 
Perceived behavioral control 
I would be able to adhere to the information disclosure policy on my own.  
c 
 
(Taylor & Todd, 
1995) 
Adhering to the information disclosure policy is entirely within my 
control. 
I have the resources and the knowledge and the ability to adhere to the 
information disclosure policy. 
E* 
Manipulation check: self-reported effort  
Adhering to the information disclosure policy was very frustrating. 
b 
(adapted from Wang 
& Benbasat, 2009) 
I could easily adhere to the information disclosure policy. (R) 
Adhering to the information disclosure policy took too much time. 
Adhering to the information disclosure policy was easy. (R) 
Adhering to the information disclosure policy required too much effort. 
Adhering to the information disclosure policy was too complex. 
Note: * reversed coded items (noted with an R in the item text) were recoded to be consistent with the other items.   
            Scales: a. 1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree 
b. 0 = Strong Disagree; 10 = Strong Agree  
c. 1 = Almost Never; 2 = Very Rarely; 3 = Rarely; 4 = Occasionally; 5 = Frequently; 6 = Very Frequently; 7 = Almost 
Always 
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Appendix B: Instrument Validation 











































1 2 3 
1 Intentions 5.683 1.125 1.001 0.893 0.864 0.712 0.844   
2 PBC 5.263 1.222 1.006 0.944 0.937 0.877 0.006 0.936  
3 Self-reported effort 5.259 1.164 1.007 0.954 0.956 0.766 (0.026) (0.77) 0.875 
Note: SQRT of AVE on Diagonals of the Correlation Matrix 











































1 2 3 
1 Intentions 5.595 1.297 13.700* 0.977 0.977 0.935 0.967   
2 PBC 5.244 1.067 1.124 0.844 0.840 0.638 0.292 0.799  
3 Self-reported effort 5.447 1.071 13.999* 0.938 0.937 0.714 (0.462) (0.324) 0.845 
Note: *If including self-reported effort in the model, the VIF indicates that multicollinearity is too high; however, the self-reported effort variable 
was only used for manipulation checks and was not included in the actual model. When excluding self-reported effort (as done in our models to 
test the hypotheses), the VIF is acceptable: 1.094 for intentions. We, therefore, deem multicollinearity to be a nonissue in our model.  
SQRT of AVE on diagonals of the correlation matrix 










































1 2 3 
1 Intentions 6.224 1.007 1.334 0.979 0.979 0.940 0.970   




5.096 1.143 1.036 0.874 0.869 0.554 (0.081) (0.052) 0.744 
Note: SQRT of AVE on diagonals of the correlation matrix 
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Table B4. Experiment 1 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
Component 
Effort PBC Intentions 
int1 -0.01 -0.08 0.79 
int2 -0.02 0.05 0.91 
int3 -0.12 0.05 0.96 
pbc1 -0.36 0.86 0 
pbc2 -0.43 0.87 -0.07 
pbc3 -0.4 0.82 0.02 
effort1 0.72 -0.55 -0.13 
effort2 0.76 -0.44 -0.23 
effort3 0.79 -0.45 -0.13 
effort4 0.86 -0.2 -0.03 
effort5 0.9 -0.32 0.01 
effort6 0.89 -0.32 0.05 
Note: Extraction method: Principal component analysis  
            Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
Table B5. Experiment 2 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
Component 
Effort Intentions PBC 
int1 -0.15 0.97 0.08 
int2 -0.18 0.94 0.1 
int3 -0.16 0.96 0.07 
pbc1 -0.33 0.15 0.8 
pbc2 -0.28 0.03 0.82 
pbc3 -0.28 0.08 0.82 
effort1 0.83 -0.15 -0.28 
effort2 0.84 -0.1 -0.2 
effort3 0.85 -0.19 -0.23 
effort4 0.76 -0.08 -0.26 
effort5 0.82 -0.16 -0.27 
effort6 0.85 -0.19 -0.24 
Note: Extraction method: Principal component analysis.  
          Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization. 
Table B6. Experiment 3 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
Component 
Effort Intentions PBC 
int1 -0.07 0.93 0.29 
int2 -0.08 0.95 0.24 
int3 -0.08 0.95 0.24 
pbc1 -0.15 0.3 0.85 
pbc2 -0.13 0.27 0.87 
pbc3 -0.14 0.21 0.9 
effort1 0.79 -0.04 0.1 
effort2 0.65 -0.04 -0.11 
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effort3 0.85 -0.07 -0.08 
effort4 0.65 0.02 -0.13 
effort5 0.83 -0.12 -0.16 
effort6 0.85 -0.09 -0.18 
Note: Extraction method: Principal component analysis  
            Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization 
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Appendix C: Training Material 
In all three studies, we provided a security policy and associated online training to help ensure participants understand 
the security expectations. In addition, we asked participants to complete a questionnaire to verify comprehension. For 
Studies 1 and 2, Figure C1 shows a screenshot of part of the security policy, and Figure C2 shows a segment of the 
video. For Study 3, Figure C3 shows part of the security policy, Figure C4 shows the security policy reminder (shown 
just-in-time), and Figure C5 shows a segment of the security training video. 
 
 
Figure C1. Security Policy for Studies 1 and 2 




Figure C2. Screenshot of Video Segment Training for Studies 1 and 2  
(5-Minute Narrated Slide Show) 
 
Figure C3. Security Policy for Study 3 
 
Figure C4. Security Policy Reminder for Study 3 
 
Figure C5. Short Training Video (Narrated Slide Show) for Study 3. 
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